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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
•oooOooo—
NATIONAL SERVICE INDUSTRIES,
INC. ,
Plaintiff/Appellant,

Case No. 960120
Priority No. 15

v.
B.W. NORTON MANUFACTURING
COMPANY, INC., a California
Corporation,
Defendant/Appellee,
and INTERNATIONAL MACHINE &
TOOL WORKS, INC., a Illinois
corporation,
Defendant.

•oooOooo—
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Utah Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over this
case under Utah Code Anno. §78-2-2(3)j.

This case was transferred

to

the

the

Utah

described

in

Court
Utah

of

Appeals

Code

Anno.

under

§78-2-2(4)

pour

over
This

authority
court

has

jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Anno. §78-2a-3(2) (k) .
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
All issues below were decided as a matter of law, and this
court does not give deference to the lower court's rulings.
v.

Fashion

Center,

Ltd.,

Ill

P.2d 1033,1039 (Utah 1989)

BeruJbe

The following issues are presented on appeal:
1.

Does Utah's Tort Reform Act (Utah Code Anno. §78-27-37 et.

seg. ) create

a

right

for

one

defendant

to

have

another

co-

defendant's proportionate fault determined?
(Raised below: Summary Judgment hearing transcript (R. p. 192,
1. 24-25 and NSI's memorandum p. 8)
2.

Are cross-claims "compulsory," and thus waived if not

brought in a suit involving two co-defendants.
(Raised below: Summary Judgment hearing transcript (R p. 202,
1. 19-21 and NSI's memorandum p. 3)
3.

Does Utah's Tort Reform Act (Utah Code Anno. §78-27-37 et.

seg. ) allow

"reimbursement" to NSI of its settlement with the

plaintiff Packer (for 100% of Packer's damages), to the extent codefendant Norton's fault caused these damages?
(Raised below: Summary Judgment hearing transcript (R p.198,
1. 1-7 and NSI's memorandum p. 8)
4.

Does res

judicata

bar NSI's claim for indemnity against

Norton, when the claims were never litigated because of lack of
standing.
(Raised below: Summary Judgment hearing transcript (R p.218,
1. 21-23 and NSI's memorandum p. 3)

2

5.

In light of the legislature's intent under Utah Code Anno.

§78-27-37, et. seq. ,
adopting

"comparative

should this court follow other courts in
implied

indemnity"

in product

liability

cases, rather than pure "implied indemnity" which was adopted in
Utah in Hanover

Ltd.

v.

Cessna

Aircraft

Co.,

758 P. 2d 443 (Ut. App.

1988)?
(Raised below: Summary Judgment hearing transcript (R p. 198,
1. 13-16)
6.
Norton's

Do the United States and Utah constitutions require that
fault be determined

at some point

in the

litigation

process, and that notice be given NSI of when such claims must be
brought?

(Raised below: Summary Judgment hearing transcript (R p.

205, 1. 13 - p. 206, 1. 12 and NSI memorandum at p. 6.)
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Constitutional Provisions
The United States and Utah Constitutions demand that NSI be
given an opportunity to have Norton's fault determined, and require
that the statutes and rules set forth when and how that opportunity
is available.

Those constitutional provisions are:

United States Constitution, 5th Amendment (Due Process):
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or
indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in
3

the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in
actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall
any person be subject for the same offence to be twice
put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor
be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation.
Utah Constitution, Article 1, Section 7 (Due Process):
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property,
without due process of law.
Utah Constitution, Article 1, Section 11 (Open Courts):
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injurydone to him in his person, property or reputation, shall
have remedy by due course of law, which shall be
administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no
person shall be barred from prosecuting or defending
before any tribunal in this State, by himself or counsel,
any civil cause to which he is a party.
Statutes
The Utah Tort Reform Act

(Utah Code Anno. §78-27-37 to 43)

requires that no defendant pay more than its proportionate share of
fault

and

that

the proportionate

determined by the fact finder.

fault

of

each

defendant

be

See Addendum 1 for Utah Code Anno.

§78-27-37 to 43.
Rules
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 13(f) states that cross-claims
"may" be brought rather than "shall" as used in Rule 13 (a) on
"compulsory counterclaims."

Rule 13(f) reads:
4

(f) Cross-claim against co-party. A pleading may state
as a cross-claim any claim by one party against a coparty arising out of the transaction or occurrence that
is the subject-matter either of the original action or of
a counterclaim therein or relating to any property that
is the subject-matter of the original action.
Such
cross-claim may include a claim that the party against
whom it is asserted is or may be liable to the crossclaimant for all or part of a claim asserted in the
action against the cross-claimant.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND OF CASE
This is the second appeal involving these two parties.
first appeal is Packer

v.

National

Service

Industries,

The

909 P.2d

1277 (Ut. App. 1996) (Addendum 2).
Background of First Appeal
The two parties to both these appeals were co-defendants in a
suit filed by Sherman Packer who was functionally blinded in one
eye when he opened a container manufactured by appellee Norton, and
filled with soap by appellant NSI. The container was pressurized,
and exploded, driving the seal which covered the pouring spout into
Packer's eye.
Plaintiff alleged that the container was negligently designed,
and also unreasonably dangerous, since it would become pressurized
when shipped from sea level to mountain regions like Salt Lake, and
had

no

warning

or

means

to

5

release

the

pressure.

The

pressurization occurred due to differences in atmospheric pressures
which naturally differ with altitude, and will occur whether the
container is filled with soap (as NSI used it), water, or even if
it is empty.

(Affidavit of plaintiff's expert Dr. de Nevers, R. p.

149)
In the first case involving these parties, appellee Norton
moved for summary judgment against plaintiff.
was

going

respond.

to resist

the motion

and

Plaintiff's counsel

obtained

an extension

to

At the last moment, however, plaintiff's counsel decided

not to respond, in part because ". . . i t literally doesn't make
any difference to me if it's both of those defendants at trial or
one.

I could have made an opposition, and maybe the outcome would

be different" (R. p. 194, 1.16-19).
Plaintiff's counsel realized that as long as the original
judge granted summary judgment and refused to allow the other
defendant

to

claim

plaintiff

would

the

dismissed

defendant

was

liable,

still obtain 100% of his damages and yet

that
the

plaintiff would not have to contend with two cross-examinations,
two opening arguments, two closings, etc.

As only one product was

involved, either defendant in the chain of distribution would be
liable for the unreasonably dangerous product.

6

Upon hearing that plaintiff had suddenly decided not to resist
Norton's Motion for Summary Judgment, co-defendant NSI filed a
quick opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment, but argued
that it had no obligation to do so.

NSI argued that summary

judgment should be granted, since it was not resisted by plaintiff,
but that the fault should be determined by the jury since the
dismissal was not "on the merits," but was because plaintiff had
failed to resist the motion, much like a dismissal for failure to
prosecute is not on the merits.
The lower court in the first case heard NSI's arguments, but
granted the summary judgment and ruled that Norton's fault would
not be determined at trial. The result of the ruling was that NSI
would pay Norton's proportionate share of fault, unless Norton's
fault was later determined by another court.
NSI

later

settled

settlement conferences.

with

plaintiff

during

court

ordered

Plaintiff demanded 100% of his damages,

fearing he could not appeal a summary judgment which he had not
resisted, but agreed to cooperate with NSI in pursuing the claims
against Norton.
Disposition of Original Appeal
NSI appealed the original court's grant of summary judgment.
In the original action, neither Norton nor NSI filed cross-claims
7

against each other.

The appellate court held that since no cross-

claim had been filed, there was no standing for NSI to dispute
Norton's Motion for Summary Judgment either in the lower court, or
on appeal.

For additional detail on the suit and appeal, see

Addendum 3 (Course of Proceedings Underlying the First Appeal) and
Addendum 4 (Statement of Facts Underlying the First Appeal)
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND OF THE PRESENT CASE
Soon after

the summary

judgment, NSI

sued Norton

in the

present case asserting a cause of action based on the cross-claims
it could have filed in the original case, since Utah Rule of Civil
Procedure 13(f) makes cross-claims permissive, not being waived if
brought at a later date.

Those claims included negligent design in

the manufacture of Norton's container, breach of warranty, strict
liability,

and

indemnification,

since

NSI

was

a

downstream

manufacturer.
The

lower court

in this case made its ruling before

appellate court ruled in the original case.

the

The lower court here

ruled that there is no cause of action to have a co-defendant's
proportionate

fault determined, and dismissed those claims for

failure to state a cause of action.

On NSI's indemnity claims,

appellee Norton argued, and the lower court held, that the original
court correctly granted standing to NSI, heard the arguments of
8

NSI, and ruled against NSI on the merit.
determined that the doctrine of res

The lower court thus

judicata

precluded the court

from allowing the claims to be argued a second time.
When the original appellate court later ruled, its ruling
directly contradicted what the lower court here had anticipated.
The appellate

court ruled there was no standing

lawsuit to argue against Norton's summary judgment.

in the

first

NSI's claims

have yet to be heard and decided by a court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS RELEVANT TO ISSUES ON APPEAL
1.

NSI

filed

a

complaint

requesting

that Norton's"...

percentage or proportion of fault..." be determined. (R. p. 003-4).
2.

The compliant had four causes of action, including: "Tort

Reform Act, Proportionate Fault" (R. p. 003) ; "Negligence" (R. p.
004); "Breach of Warranty" (R. p. 005); and "Strict Liability" (R.
p. 006).
3.The lower court Ruled "...as a matter of law that the first
and second causes of action in the plaintiff's complaint fail to
state

a

claim

upon

which

relief

could

be

granted"

(R.

p.

164)(Court's Order of Dismissal and Summary Judgment also reprinted
in Addendum 5) because there is no claim to have a co-defendant's
proportionate fault determined nor a claim for contribution.

9

4.

The lower court granted summary judgment on the third and

fourth causes of action as "... barred by res

judicata

doctrine..."

(R. p. 165) since the prior "... Packer litigation resulted in a
final judgment in favor of B. W. Norton ..." (R. p. 165), and since
the "...issues have been determined in a final judgment on the
merits in the Packer litigation" (R. p. 166).
5.

After the lower court ruled, the appellate court in the

original case ruled that "...NSI was not a proper party to the
motion for summary judgment brought by Norton, did not have a
right...to oppose Norton's motion, and does not have a right to
appeal the court's order that granted Norton's motion." (Packer

National

Service

Industries,

Inc.,

v.

909 P.2d 1277, 1278 (Utah App.

1996)(Addendum 2 ) .
6.

The appellate court held that "...NSI could have protected

its potential claim against Norton by filing a cross-claim against
Norton under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 13(f)." Id.
7.

1278.

The appellate court also held that "NSI could also protect

a possible claim against Norton by filing an independent action
claiming indemnity, if filing a cross-claim was considered to be
tactically undesirable."

Id.

1278.

10

8. The claims which the appellate court ruled could be filed,
for

Norton's

proportionate

fault

to

be

determined

and

for

indemnity, were dismissed by the lower court. (R. p. 164-6).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
I.

UTAH CODE ANNO. §78-27-37 CREATES A RIGHT FOR ONE

DEFENDANT TO

HAVE ANOTHER DEFENDANT'S FAULT DETERMINED.

The Utah Court of Appeals, in the previous case between these
two parties, held that a cross-claim may be filed between two codefendants to have each defendant's proportionate fault determined.
II.

CROSS-CLAIMS ARE CLEARLY PERMISSIVE, NOT COMPULSORY.

Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 13(f) states

w

[a] pleading may

state as a cross-claim . . . ." The Federal Rule is the same, and
Moores Federal
and Procedure

Practice,

Wright, Miller & Kane's Federal

Practice

and case law confirm that "Cross-claims are always

permissive" and " [a] party who decides not to bring his [crossclaim] will not be barred . . . ." Wright, Miller & Kane,
Practice

and Procedure

III.

Federal

§1431.

THE UTAH TORT REFORM ACT, UTAH CODE ANNO. §78-27-37

CREATES A CAUSE OF ACTION TO HAVE A PARTY'S PROPORTIONATE FAULT
DETERMINED AFTER SETTLEMENT WITH PLAINTIFF.
Utah Code Anno. §78-27-44, et seq.
cause

of action

for

specifically creates

a

"reimbursement" which allows NSI to be
11

reimbursed for its settlement of 100% of plaintiff's damages, to
the extent Norton's fault caused those damages.
IV.

NSI'S INDEMNIFICATION CLAIMS HAVE NEVER BEEN CONSIDERED

BY A COURT AND RES JUDICATA DOES NOT BAR THEM.
NSI's indemnification claims have never been considered by a
court, and the lower court erred in granting summary judgment based

on res
V.

judicata.
"COMPARATIVE IMPLIED INDEMNITY" SHOULD BE ADOPTED BY THIS

COURT TO REFLECT LEGISLATIVE INTENT.
This court should adopt "comparative implied indemnity" in
product cases, as other courts have done, in light of the Utah
legislature's

intent

that

no

defendant

pay

more

than

its

proportionate share.
VI.

THE UNITED STATES AND UTAH CONSTITUTIONS GUARANTEE THAT

NSI MAY HAVE NORTON'S FAULT DETERMINED AT SOME POINT IN THE COURTS.
ARGUMENT
POINT I:

In

UTAH CODE ANNO. §78-27-37, CREATES A RIGHT FOR ONE
DEFENDANT TO HAVE ANOTHER DEFENDANT'S FAULT DETERMINED.
the

previous

appeal

between

these

two parties, the

appellate court ruled that NSI did not have a right to respond to
Norton's Motion for Summary Judgment " [b]ecause NSI did not bring
a cross-claim against Norton . . . ."

12

Packer

v National

Service

Industries

Inc.,

909 P.2d 1277, 1279 (Ct. App. 1996)(Addendum 2 ) .

Nor could NSI

"appeal the court's order that granted Norton's

motion."

Id.

at 1279.

stated that " . . .

In that opinion, the appellate court also

NSI could have protected its potential claim

against Norton by filing a cross-claim against Norton under Utah
Rule of Civil Procedure 13(f)."

Id.

at 1278.

In this very case,

the appellate court held that a cause of action, a cross-claim,
exists between two defendants under the Utah Tort Reform Act.
While the statute

itself does not mention a cross-claim,

judicial interpretation, in this very case, makes clear that such
cross-claims exist to have a co-defendant's proportionate fault
determined.1

Utah Code Anno. §78-27-37 defines "defendant" as a person
" . . . claimed to be liable because of fault to any person seeking
recovery." A "person seeking recovery" is ". . . seeking damages
or reimbursement on its own behalf . . . ." Technically, one
defendant does not seek damages from another defendant who is
already joined as a party, but only seeks to assure the codefendant's proportionate fault is determined by the fact finder.
Thus, a co-defendant is not, in the words of Utah Rule of Civil
Procedure 13(f), " . . . liable to the cross-claimant. . ." for a
claim of damages, but is liable for that defendant's own
proportionate share of fault. Wright, Miller & Kane §1431, p. 231
maintain that a cross-claim that does not " . . . assert a plea for
affirmative relief but merely alleges a complete defense . . . ,"
even though " . . . it intends the cross-claimant is completely
blameless. . . does not raise any issue between the co-parties and
is not properly assertable under the cross-claim provision." It
should also be noted that Utah Code Anno. §78-27-41 allows one
13

There

is then, clearly a cause of action to have

defendant's proportionate fault determined.

a co-

The lower court was

incorrect in dismissing the complaint for failure to state a claim.
The next question is, when can such a cross-claim be brought.
POINT II: CROSS-CLAIMS ARE CLEARLY PERMISSIVE, NOT COMPULSORY.
A. The Utah Rule, Commentators, and Case Law Confirm Cross-claims
Are Permissive and Can Be Brought in a Late Suit.
The appellate court ruled that a cross-claim "could" have been
filed.

While "could" can be read in the past tense, the court

never addressed "when" a cross-claim can be filed.

The rules,

commentators and cases all hold that a cross-claim is permissive,
and can be brought either between two defendants in the original
suit, or in a later suit, as was done here.
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 13(f) states:

"A pleading may

state as a cross-claim . . . ." (emphasis added)
The rule clearly states that cross-claims "may" be brought.
This rule contrasts with Rule 13(a) which is entitled "Compulsory
Counterclaims", and uses the word "shall" instead of "may".
The Federal Rule and Utah's rule on cross-claims are the same,
although Utah's is Rule 13(f) and the federal cross-claim rule is

"defendant" to ". . . join as a defendant . . . " any other person
who may have contributed to the damage, although "join" is referred
to in the sense of adding a person not yet a party to the lawsuit.
14

13(g).

Moore's

Federal

Practice

confirms

cross-claims

are

permissive, and may be pleaded later if the defendant so chooses.
"The

subdivision

[on cross-claims],

though

reading

much

like

subdivision (a) concerning compulsory counterclaim, is permissive;
the claim may, but need not, be pleaded."
2d 1Jl3.34[l].

Moore's Federal Practice

(Emphasis in original).

Wright, Miller, and Kane, Federal

Practice

and

Procedure,

§1431, also states this clear principle:
Rule
13(g)
[cross-claims],
unlike
Rule
13 (a)
[counterclaims], always is permissive.
A party who
decides not to bring his claim under Rule 13(g) will not
be barred by res judicata,
waiver, or estoppel from
asserting it in a later action, as he would if the claim
were a compulsory counterclaim under Rule 13(a)."
(Emphasis added)
Since a cross-claim is permissive, it is not waived if not
filed in the original suit.

Importantly, if there is no such

independent cause of action to have a co-defendant's proportionate
fault determined, there is no such cross-claim either.
Although Rule 13(g) permits a party to assert, by way of
cross-claim, a claim which could be asserted only in an
independent action except for the authorization of
subdivision (g) . the Rule does not affect substantive
rights. . . . The cross-claimant must have a valid claim
against his co-party. Whether he has such a claim is a
substantive matter; whether he may assert it in a suit
brought against him or his co-party or must bring an
independent action is procedural.
Moore's Federal Practice 2d 1|l3.37 (emphasis added).
15

Case law holds the same.
Under both federal and Missouri law it is clear that
cross-claims
are
merely
permissive
rather
than
compulsory.
[cit. Omitted] Accordingly, a party to an
action having a claim in the nature of a cross-claim has
the option to pursue it in an independent action.
Augustin

v Mughal,

521 F.2d 1215 at 1216 (8th Cir 1975) (emphasis

added).
Since a cross-claim exists between two defendant's to have
each others proportionate fault determined, the lower court erred
in dismissing the complaint below.

Since it was not brought in the

original suit, it may be brought now.

The lower court erred in

dismissing that claim.
There is no question that any cross-claim, including one under
Utah Code Anno. §78-27-37, et. seq. between co-defendants to have
each other's fault determined is permissive.

Since cross-claims

are always permissive, the lower court erred in dismissing the
suit, holding no such claim exists.

The lower court made its

ruling before the appellate opinion clarifying that a cross-claim
exists.
NSI

Thus, the lower court erred in dismissing the claim.
has

proportionate

a

substantive

right

fault determined.

to

sue

Norton

to

have

its

NSI can do so, procedurally,

either in a separate suit or a cross-claim.

If there is no such

substantive cause of action, there is no cross-claim that could
16

have been filed as the appellate court held.
appellate court confirm such a right exists.

The statute and the
Rule 13(f) makes

clear the right is permissive and not waived if not brought in the
original suit.

Not aware of the appellate court ruling, the lower

court erred in dismissing the suit.
Court: If you tried to file a cross-claim in my court
against a defendant who was either not named, or was
named, for anything other than ensuring they were on the
jury verdict for determination of responsibility,
assuming there was some evidence they had some
responsibility, I wouldn't allow it because you can't
file a cross-claim for contribution. You can, under the
statute, ask the court to include either a non-party, and
if they are a co-party, they'll be in, if there's any
evidence to have their fault evaluated.
The lower court construed the claim as one for contribution, and
was of the opinion that no claim exists between two co-defendants
to have each other's proportionate fault determined.

The original

appellate opinion between these two Darties specifically allows
bringing a cross-claim.

Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 13(f) makes

clear cross-claims are permissive, and may be brought in a separate
suit.

Moore's, Wright, Miller and Kane and case law confirm the

obvious.

Cross-claims are, in Wright, Miller and Kane's words

"always permissive," and "a party who decides to bring his claim
under Rule

13(g)

[Utah's 13(f)] will not be barred

Wriaht, Miller & Kane, Federal

Practice

17

and Procedure

. . . ."
§1431.

B.

Policy Reasons Behind Permissive Cross-claims.
Wright, Miller 5c Kane's Federal

Practice

p. 424 discusses the considerations that

and Procedure
n

§4450,

. . . are doubtless

accountable for the general rule that cross-claims among co-parties
are permissive, not mandatory."

Among the considerations are that

the co-defendants had no say in the choice of form, timing of the
litigation, and u[m]ore important, the strategic impact of party
alignment is quite different."
defendant's incentives

Id.

". . . t o

Several examples are given of
reduce the total extent of

liability rather than adjust the claims of the defendants."

Id.

They acknowledge such concerns may be "mere irrationalities" but
conclude

xx

[t]hey are vitally real nonetheless" and must serve as a

basis of rules.
There is no need to fear duplicate lawsuits, where codefendants have a trial against the plaintiff, obtain a verdict
dividing their fault, and then sue each other a second time if they
are displeased with the percentage of fault assigned them in the
first trial.

Established law of res

judicata

litigation, not to mention the expense.

prevents duplicate

But here the later filed

cross-claim is allowed by the rules. Norton has not had its fault
determined.

There is no judgment on the merits as required by res

judicata.
18

Cross-claims are clearly permissive, for good reason.

The

rule on cross-claims allow co-defendants who have an independent
action, to bring the claim, if they desire, in the suit with the
original plaintiff.
exists.

The appellate court held such a cross-claim

The lower court has erred in dismissing the complaint for

failure to state a claim.
POINT III:

A

THE UTAH TORT REFORM ACT, UTAH CODE ANNO. §78-27-37
CREATES A CAUSE OF ACTION TO HAVE A PARTY'S
PROPORTIONATE FAULT DETERMINED AFTER SETTLEMENT
WITH PLAINTIFF.

second,

dismissing

the

independent
claim

to

reason
have

une

lower

Norton's

court

erred

proportionate

in

fault

determined is that the tort reform statute allows a settling party
to sue for "reimbursement." Utah Code Anno. §78-27-37, states that
wx

Persons seeking recovery' means any person seeking damages or

reimbursement

on its own behalf.

. . ."

NSI

is seeking

u

reimbursement on its own behalf" as specifically authorized by the

statute.
When Norton's original summary judgment was granted, Norton
did

not

participate

conferences.

in

several

court

ordered

settlement

Plaintiff was reasonable in his settlement demands,

but insisted that the entire amount be paid by NSI, since Norton
had received summary judgment.

Plaintiff refused to appeal the
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summary

judgment

he

had

not

resisted,

(even

questioning

his

standing to do so since he had never resisted it) but offered to
assist NSI in a trial against Norton if NSI would pay all of his
damages.

Plaintiff has now been made whole.

NSI needs to have Norton's proportionate fault determined, so
it can be "reimbursed" for that portion of Plaintiff's injuries
caused by Norton.

"Reimbursement", as used by the statute has been

interpreted by the Supreme Court, in Sullivan

v.

Scoular

Grain,

853 P.2d 877 at 881 (Utah 1993), to include employers and their
insurance carriers, under the Worker's Compensation Act, as such
persons

seeking

"reimbursement".

Similarly,

NSI

is

seeking

reimbursement, as the act specifically authorizes.
Courts have always encouraged settlement.

Because Norton was

granted summary judgment, it did not participate in the settlement
conferences, nor in the settlement.

The statute recognizes that a

settling party should not be penalized.

The statute authorizes NSI

to sue for "reimbursement," allowing cases to settle, when not all
parties are present.
The tort reform statute's very purpose is

"...

to ensure

that Nno defendant is liable to any person seeking recovery for any
amount in excess of the proportion of fault attributable to that
defendant'"

Sullivan,

supra, at 880 (quoting Utah Code Ann. §7820

27-38) . The statute allows for unusual situations, such as this,
by allowing a party to be "reimbursed" for a reasonable settlement.
Again, the complaint states a cause of action.

The lower court

erred in dismissing it.
POINT IV: NSI'S INDEMNIFICATION CLAIMS HAVE NEVER BEEN CONSIDERED
BY A COURT AND RES JUDICATA DOES NOT BAR THEM.
Background of the Indemnity Claim.
Hanover

Ltd.

v.

Cessna

Aircraft,

758 P.2d 443 (Ut. App. 1988),

held that, under certain circumstances, a upstream manufacturer in
a strict liability case, must indemnify the downstream distributor
not only for a judgment or settlement, but also attorney's fees and
costs.

Here, Norton manufactured the container, and included in

its product, as delivered to NSI, the sharp-edged seal which struck
Mr. Packer's eye. NSI made no alteration to the seal or container.
NSI received the container, including the seal, put liquid in the
container, precisely as intended by Norton, and sold the container
to Mr. Packer.

The Complaint stated a claim for indemnification.

The breach of Warranty claim is similar).
Summary Judgment Based on Res

Judicata.

The court acknowledged that the complaint stated a claim for
indemnity, but granted summary judgment based on res judicata.
lower court stated:
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The

In all candor [counsel] where Judge Brian [original lower
court judge] entered a summary judgment where you were
present and had the opportunity to be heard, and I don't
buy into the argument that you don't, as a co-defendant
in a nexus case, don't have standing, I just don't, I
think you do, I think you have all the right to come down
and squawk about summary judgment . . . ."
R. p. 218, 1. 8-14
"The doctrine of res

judicata

serves the important policy of

preventing previously litigated issues from being relitigated."

Salt

Lake City

v. Silver

Fork Pipeline

Corp.,

279 Utah Adv. Rep. 3

(Utah 1995) . Here however, the court of appeals ruled there was no
standing, and the claims were never heard, no judgment was entered.
Even if a judgment had been entered, the lower court would
have to determine if there had been a "full and fair opportunity"
to litigate the claims, since the parties were co-defendants, and
may not press their claims against each other. "The rendition of a
judgment in an action does not conclude parties to the action who
are not adversaries under the pleadings as to their rights inter se
upon matters which they did not litigate, or have an opportunity to
litigate, between themselves." (quoting Restatement of Judgments
§82

(1942)).

The

party

barred

from

litigating

a

claim

in

a

subsequent action must have had a full and fair opportunity to
litigate the same claim in the prior case."

Id.

The same case

concluded: "Silver Fork made no claims, litigated no issues, and
22

had no right of appeal against its co-plaintiff, Salt Lake City"
Id.,

so it was not precluded from litigating the claims.
Here, the merits were never considered, there is no final

judgment on the merits.

The lower court believed that the first

appellate court would allow standing and decide, on the merits, if
Norton had fault.

In actuality, the court ruled that procedurally

there was no standing, and there was no right to resist the
original motion.

Norton has never had its fault determined.

Far

from having the merits decided twice, Norton has yet to have its
fault determined.

The case should be remanded for trial on the

merits of the indemnification claims.
POINT V:

"COMPARATIVE IMPLIED INDEMNITY" SHOULD BE ADOPTED BY THIS
COURT TO REFLECT LEGISLATIVE INTENT.

The Utah Tort Reform Statute provides that NSI can sue Norton
for its proportionate share of fault.

However, if this court

disagrees, this court should adopt "comparative implied indemnity"
in product liability cases. Other courts, not having the benefit
of a statute, have been faced with the intent of the legislature to
have each party pay its proportionate share, and the inequity of
implied indemnity in product liability cases, which requires a codefendant to be 100% free from fault in order to recover.
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The

original appellate court acknowledged NSI's right to sue Norton for
indemnity.
Implied indemnity in product liability cases was adopted in
Hanover

Ltd.

v Cessna

Aircraft

Co.,

758 P.2d 443 (UT Ct App 1988) .

While implied indemnity as adopted in Hanover

allows NSI to proceed

against Norton, it has two inherent inequities.

The first inequity

is, of course, that pure implied indemnity is 'all or nothing'.
A. Pure
Intent.

Implied

Indemnity

is Unfair

and Violates

Legislative

If NSI is 1% liable, and Norton 99%, NSI receives nothing.
This unfair result flies in the face of the legislature's intent in
enacting comparative fault.

The Utah Supreme Court held that the

purpose of the Utah Tort Reform statute is u . . . t o ensure that
x

no defendant is liable . . . in excess of the proportion of fault

attributable to that defendant."

Sullivan

at 880.

"Pure" implied

indemnity violates the very intent of the Tort Reform Statute, by
allowing a tort feasor who is 99% at fault, to pay absolutely
nothing.

Here, if NSI is only 1% at fault, it can pay 100% of the

damages.
When the Utah courts adopted pure implied indemnity, the Tort
Reform Statute was not yet law.

Now that the legislature has made

clear that no party is liable in excess of its proportionate fault,
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this court should adopt "comparative" implied indemnity to reflect
the

legislature's

specifically

intent.

says that

Utah

Code

"fault," as used

Anno.

§78-27-37(2)

in the act,

includes

". . . strict liability, breach of . . . warranty of a product,
[and] products liability . . . ."

The legislature intended that no

defendant in a product case pay more than its proportionate share.
Numerous courts have realized this in equity, and adopted a
version of "impled comparative indemnity".
other

courts have applied

Kansas, New York and

the fairness of comparative

law by

adopting "comparative" implied indemnity.
In Kennedy

v.

City

of

Sawyer,

618 P.2d 788, 800 (Kan. 1980),

the Supreme Court of Kansas recognized that

w

[t]he traditional

implied indemnity . . . has been at best a 'blunt instrument' for
reallocating loss."

The Kansas court concluded that:

A large and well-reasoned body of law in comparative
negligence jurisdictions has determined that the concept
of active/passive negligence has been extinguished by the
introduction of comparative negligence.
Kennedy,

supra, at 8 00.

The Kansas court noted that

The [US] Supreme Court in Reliable
Transfer
held that the
rule merely replaced one unfairness with another, and
concluded that the responsibility for damages as between
two wrongdoers should be determined by their relative
percentages of fault.
Kennedy,

supra, at 801.
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The

Kansas

common-law

court

rules

in

u

.

.

light

. re-evaluat[ed]
of

recently

comparative negligence," [Kennedy,

well-established

adopted

principles

of

supra, at 802.], and concluded

that:
When as here a settlement for plaintiffs' entire injuries
or damages has been made by one tort feasor during the
pendency of a comparative negligence action and a release
of all liability has been given by the plaintiffs to all
who may have contributed to said damages, apportionment
of responsibility can then be pursued in the action among
the tort feasors.
Kennedy,

supra, at 803.

In this case, NSI settled all of plaintiff's claims, avoiding
a very expensive trial
being deposed).

(one expert had charged $29,000 without

NSI believes the settlement was favorable.

Norton

will share in NSI's favorable settlement, or if Norton can prove
NSI settled rashly, Norton will pay a portion of a smaller verdict.
B.
Comparative Implied Indemnity Does Nothing to Alleviate the
Unfairness in Negligence or Other Cases.
Comparative

implied

indemnity

cures

the

inequity

of

one

defendant paying for another defendant's fault in product liability
cases, but does nothing to cure that problem in negligence or other
cases.

This case involves claims of negligence, product liability

and breach of warranty.

26

Implied

indemnity,

even when

treated

comparatively,

only

applies to product liability claims. There is no reason to allow
comparative impled indemnity on the product liability claim, but no
reimbursement on the negligence claim.

NSI maintains that the

better course for this court to take is to simply follow Utah Code
Anno.

§78-27-37

et seg. and

allow

reimbursement

from Norton,

proportionate to Norton's fault, because the statute creates a
cause of action between co-defendants, as held by the previous
appellate court.

Utah Code Anno. §78-17-37 language provides for

reimbursement due to all fault, not just product liability claims.
This court, if it declines to allow NSI to proceed against
Norton based on Norton's proportionate fault under Utah Code Anno.
§78-17-37,

et

seq.

should

modernize

Utah's

implied

indemnity

referred to by the appellate court, and allow NSI to proceed with
its indemnity claim based on comparative principles.
POINT VI: THE UNITED STATES AND UTAH CONSTITUTIONS GUARANTEE THAT
NSI MAY HAVE NORTON'S FAULT DETERMINED AT SOME POINT IN
THE COURTS.
A. Norton Argues That NSI Has No Current Claim Since It Did Not
File A Cross-Claim.
Norton must acknowledge that NSI has a constitutional right to
have Norton's fault determined, but Norton claims that right was

27

waived when NSI did not file a permissive cross-claim in the first
case.
Norton

has

cited

no

law

below

that

"compulsory" and has cited no reasons that
claims would be either fair or efficient.

cross-claims

are

'compulsory' cross-

Norton has claimed that

the courts are now powerless to determine its fault, since no
cross-claim was filed in the original proceeding.
Even

if

Norton

were

correct,

that

cross-claims

compulsory, notice must be given litigants of that fact.

were

The rule

on cross-claims does not give notice they are compulsory and are
waived if not brought.

The case law and commentators do not inform

litigants that cross-claims are compulsory.

In fact, the rule, the

case law, the commentators all advise litigants that cross-claims
are permissive, and by their very nature must state a cause of
action that can be brought independently.

This is why neither

Norton or NSI filed cross-claims, and why such cross-claims were
virtually unheard of before this case.
Norton's claim of no remedy, if followed by this court, would
result in the deprivation of constitutional rights, including a
denial of due process (United States Constitution, 5th Amendment;
Utah Constitution, Article 1, Section 7) , and the open courts
provision in Article 1, section 11 of the Utah Constitution.
28

"The open courts provision guarantees 'access to the courts
and a judicial procedure that is based on fairness and equality,'
and prevents arbitrary deprivation of 'effective remedies designed
to protect basic individual rights.'11 Currier
1357

Berry

(Ut. App. 1993) quoting

Aircraft,

ex

v. Holden,
rel.

Berry

862 P. 2d
v.

Beech

111 P.2d 670 (Ut. 1985).

"Timely and adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard in
a meaningful way are the very heart of procedural fairness." Nelson
v. Jacobsen,

669 P.2d 1207, 1211 (Utah 1983).

Norton's fault must

be determined, and the right to have it determined cannot be waived
by

failing

to

file

a

permissive

cross-claim.

Under

the

circumstances of this case, Norton's proportionate fault needs to
be determined here, or due process and the open courts provision
are violated.
B.

Summary.
The essential question before this Court is whether cross-

claims are compulsory, and if not brought in a lawsuit between codefendants are forever waived.

The answer is clear.

The rules of

civil procedure, both federal and Utah, have never made crossclaims compulsory and there are a host of reasons for them not
being compulsory.

Usually, issues of cross-claims are resolved in

the first suit. They would have been resolved in this case had the
29

plaintiff resisted the motion for summary judgment.

Under unusual

circumstances, as here, the cause of action underlying the crossclaim,

and

the

statute

which

specifically

allows

reimbursement, allow the defendant's proportionate
determined.

Principles of res

judicata

re-litigation of the same issues.
litigation of the cases issues.

a

suit

for

fault to be

will prevent unnecessary

In this case, there is yet to be
The complaint states a claim.

CONCLUSION
Norton

was

sued

because

unquestionably injured a person.

a

container

it

manufactured

Norton may claim the pressure in

the container was not related to the manufacturing process it
conducted.
appellate
procedural

But those are factual questions.

To date, the first

court declined to decide on the facts because of a
issue,

lack

of

standing.

The

second

lower

court,

believing there was standing and that the appellate court would so
rule, dismissed the case as having already been heard.

Norton's

fault has never been determined, and the constitutions of the
United States and Utah provide that this injustice be remedied.
The first appellate court ruled that a claim exists between
co-defendants to have each others fault determined.

The very basis

of the Utah Tort Reform Act is to insure that one defendant does
not pay another defendant's proportionate share of fault.
30

The rule

and supporting authorities make clear that if a cause of action
exists to bring a cross-claim, the same cause of action exists to
bring an independent action. The rule on cross-claims governs only
if that cause of action may be asserted in the earlier form that
the plaintiff has chosen.

Principles of res judicata

will prevent

duplicate litigation.
NSI brought its cause of action in the lower court.

That

court did not yet have the advice of the first appellate court, and
ruled inconsistently with the appellate court's decision.

This

court should remand this case for trial on the merits of the
percentage of fault that Norton's container caused.
DATED this

/

day of October, 1996.
POWELL & LANG, LC
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the

day of October, 1996 I

mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing to the following:

Paul M. Belnap
Robert L. Janicki
STRONG & HANNI
Attorneys for the defendant/appellee
B.W. Norton Manufacturing
Sixth Floor Boston Building
9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

t^-^k^
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ADDENDUM 1
Utah Code Anno. §78-27-37 to 43

78-27-37. Definitions.
As used in Sections 78-27-37 through 78-27-43:
(1) "Defendant" means a person, other than a person
immune from suit as defined in Subsection (3), who is
claimed to be liable because of fault to any person seeking
recovery.
(2) "Fault" means any actionable breach of legal duty,
act, or omission proximately causing or contributing to
injury or damages sustained by a person seeking recovery,
including negligence in all its degrees, contributory negligence, assumption of risk, strict liability, breach of
express or implied warranty of a product, products liability, and misuse, modification or abuse of a product.
(3) "Person immune from suit" means:
(a) an employer immune from suit under Title 35,
Chapter 1 or 2; and
(b) a governmental entity or governmental employee immune from suit pursuant to Title 63, Chapter 30, Governmental Immunity Act
(4) "Person seeking recovery" means any person seeking damages or reimbursement on its own behalf, or on
behalf of another for whom it is authorized to act as legal
representative.
1994
78-27-38. Comparative n e g l i g e n c e .
(1) The fault of a person seeking recovery shall not alone
bar recovery by that person.
(2) A person seeking recovery may recover from any defendant or group of defendants whose fault, combined with the
fault of persons immune from suit, exceeds the fault of the
person seeking recovery prior to any reallocation of fault made
under Subsection 78-27-39(2).
(3) No defendant is liable to any person seeking recovery for
any amount in excess of the proportion of fault attributed to
that defendant under Section 78-27-39.
(4) (a) In determining the proportionate fault attributable
to each defendant, the fact finder may, and when requested by a party shall, consider the conduct of any
person who contributed to the alleged injury regardless of
whether the person is a person immune from suit or a
defendant in the action and may allocate fault to each
person seeking recovery, to each defendant, and to any
person immune from suit who contributed to the alleged
injury.
(b) Any fault allocated to a person immune from suit is
considered only to accurately determine the fault of the
person seeking recovery and a defendant and may not
subject the person immune from suit to any liability,
based on the allocation of fault, in this or any other action.
1994

78-27-39.

Separate special verdicts on total damages
a n d proportion of fault.
(1) The trial court may, and when requested by any party
shall, direct the jury, if ary, to find separate special verdicts
determining the total amount of damages sustained and the
percentage or proportion of fault attributable to each person

seeking recovery, to each defendant, and to any person immune from suit who contributed to the alleged injury.
(2) (a) If the combined percentage or proportion of fault
attributed to all persons immune from suit is less than
40%, the trial court shall reduce that percentage or
proportion of fault to zero and reallocate that percentage
or proportion of fault to the other parties in proportion to
the percentage or proportion of fault initially attributed to
each party by the fact finder. After this reallocation,
cumulative fault shall equal 100% with the persons immune from suit being allocated no fault.
(b) If the combined percentage or proportion of fault
attributed to all persons immune from suit is 40% or
more, that percentage or proportion of fault attributed to
persons immune from suit may not be reduced under
Subsection (2)(a).
(c) (i) The jury may not be advised of the effect of any
reallocation under Subsection (2).
(ii) The jury may be advised that fault attributed
to persons immune from suit may reduce the award of
the person seeking recovery.
(3) A person immune from suit may not be held liable,
based on the allocation of fault, in this or any other action.
1994

78-27-40. Amount of liability limited to proportion of
fault — No contribution.
(1) Subject to Section 78-27-38, the maximum amount for
which a defendant may be liable to any person seeking
recovery is that percentage or proportion of the damages
equivalent to the percentage or proportion of fault attributed
to that defendant.
(2) A defendant is not entitled to contribution from any
other person.
(3) A defendant or person seeking recovery may not bring a
civil action against any person immune from suit to recover
damages resulting from the allocation of fault under Section
78-27-38.
1994
78-27-41. J o i n d e r of defendants.
(1) A person seeking recovery, or any defendant who is a
party to the litigation, may join as a defendant, in accordance
with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, any person other than
a person immune from suit who may have caused or contributed to the injury or damage for which recovery is sought, for
the purpose of having determined their respective proportions
of fault
(2) A person immune from suit may not be named as a
defendant, but fault may be allocated to a person immune
from suit solely for the purpose of accurately'determining the
fault of the person seeking recovery and a defendant. A person
immune from suit is not subject to any liability, based on the
allocation of fault, in this or any other action.
(3) (a) A person immune from suit may intervene as a
party under Rule 24, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
regardless of whether or not money damages are sought.
(b) A person immune from suit who intervenes in an
action may not be held liable for any fault allocated to that
person under Section 78-27-38.
1994
78-27-42.

R e l e a s e t o o n e defendant d o e s not discharge
o t h e r defendants.
A release given by a person seeking recovery to one or more
defendants does not discharge any other defendant unless the
release so provides.
1986
78-27-43.

Effect o n immunity, exclusive remedy, indemnity, contribution.
Nothing in Sections 73-27-37 through 78-27-42 affects or
impairs any common law or statutory immunity from liability,
including, but not limited to, governmental immunity as
provided in Title 63, Chapter 30, and the exclusive remedy
provisions of Title 35, Chapter 1. Nothing in Sections 78-27-37
through 78-27-42 affects or impairs any right to indemnity or
contribution arising from statute, contract, or agreement.
1986

ADDENDUM 2
Packer v National Service Industries Inc.,
909 P.2d 1277 (Ct. App. 1996)

PACKER v. NATIONAL SERVICE INDUS^ INC.

Utah 1277

Cite M 909 PJW 1277 (UuhApp. 1996)

Sherman D. PACKER, Plaintiff,

NATIONAL SERVICE INDUSTRIES,
INC., a Delaware corporation;
Defendant and Appellant,
B.W. Norton Manufacturing Company,
Inc., a California corporation; and International Machine and Tool Works,
Inc., an Illinois corporation, Defendants
and Appellee.
No. 950121-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.

3. Judgment <&=>183
In civil action involving multiple defendants, when no cross-claim is brought between defendants, and when one of defendants files motion for summary judgment, codefendant does not have right to respond to
motion and, thus is barred from appealing
trial court's ruling on summary judgment
motion.
Todd S. Winegar, Wade S. Winegar, and
Karra J. Porter, Salt Lake City, for Appellant
Paul M. Belnap and Robert L. Janicki, and
Michael S. Johnson, Salt Lake City, for Appellee.

Jan. 5, 1996.
Before ORME, BENCH and WILKINS,
JJ.
Plaintiff brought negligence action
against manufacturer and user of container
lids. Manufacturer moved for summary
judgment which the District Court, Salt Lake
County, Pat B. Brian, J., granted. Codefendant appealed. The Court of Appeals,
Wilkins, J., held that user, as codefendant,
did not have right to respond to summary
judgment motion or appeal trial court's order
granting motion.
Appeal dismissed.

1. Pleading e=*183
In tort action involving multiple defendants, when no cross-claim was brought between defendants, and when one of defendants filed motion for summary judgment,
co-defendant did not have right to respond to
motion or appeal trial court's order granting
motion; co-defendant could have protected
its rights by filing cross-claim against other
defendant or filing independent action claiming indemnity. U.CA.1953, 78-27-43; Rules
Civ.Proc, Rule 13(f).
2. Pleading <s=>147
Cross-claim may include claim that party against whom it is asserted is or may be
liable to cross-claimant for all or part of
claim asserted in action against cross-claimant. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 13(f).

WILKINS, Judge:
Appellant National Service Industries, Inc.
(NSI) appeals a grant of summary judgment
entered in favor of appellee B.W. Norton
Manufacturing Company (Norton). We dismiss the appeal.

BACKGROUND
Sherman Packer iiyured his eye while
opening a container of Hi-Foam Degreaser
sold to him by NSI. Packer alleged that his
injury resulted when the pry-out seal on the
container's lid struck his eye. As a result,
Packer filed suit against NSI and Norton.
Neither NSI nor Norton filed cross-claims
against each other. NSI and Norton were
merely co-defendants in a case brought by
Packer.
Norton had sold the pail and lid of the
container that injured Packer to NSI, along
with many other pails and lids. NSI was in
the practice of placing bulk orders for these
items with Norton. Norton manufactured
the pails and lids, a process which included
installing a pour spout with a pry-out seal
made by another company into the lids, then
shipped the pails and lids in bulk to NSI.
Once NSI received the pails, it decided which
of its products it would put into them, filled
the pails with those products, and clamped
the lids down. The container Packer was
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opening when he was injured presumably
had been through this process.
Norton filed a motion for summary judgment, which Packer announced he planned to
oppose. However, at the last minute Packer
decided not to respond to Norton's motion
because he was "convinced there [was] no
possible claim against Norton." Surprised
that Packer was not opposing Norton's motion, NSI sought to oppose the motion for
summary judgment. NSI filed a memorandum and argued against Norton's motion in
court, over Norton's objection. Nevertheless, the court granted the motion for summary judgment, by which Norton was dismissed from the action. NSI settled with
Packer and now appeals the trial court's
order that granted Norton's motion for summary judgment
ISSUE ON APPEAL
We address a single question on appeal:
May a co-defendant in multi-party litigation
oppose the summary judgment motion of another co-defendant brought against the plaintiff, when the co-defendant seeking to oppose
the motion is not party to a cross-claim involving the moving co-defendant? This is a
question of law which we review for correctness. See generally, Nixon v. Salt Lake City
Corp., 898 P.2d 265, 268 (Utah 1995).
ANALYSIS
[1] We dismiss NSI's appeal because we
find that NSI was not a proper party to the
motion for summary judgment brought by
Norton, did not have a right under the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure to oppose Norton's
motion, and does not have a right to appeal
the court's order that granted Norton's motion.

not be included in the apportionment.*).
However, NSI could have protected its potential claim against Norton by filing a crosschum against Norton under Utah Rule of
Civil Procedure 13(f). "Such cross-claim
may include a claim that the party against
whom it is asserted is or may be liable to the
cross-claimant for all or part of a claim asserted in the action against the cross-claimant." Yost ex rel Yost v. State, 640 P.2d
1044, 1047 (Utah 1981) (emphasis added).
NSI could also protect a possible claim
against Norton by filing an independent action claiming indemnity, if filing a cross-claim
was considered to be tactically undesirable.
See Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-43 (1992) (stating that specific recently-amended sections of
the code do not "affect[] or impairf] any'
right to indemnity . . . arising from statute,
contract, or agreement").
Furthermore, because NSI did not have a
right to respond to Norton's motion for summary judgment against the plaintiff, NSI has
no right to appeal the court's order granting
Norton's motion. See Morrisorir-Kntidsen
Co. v. CHG Intl Inc., 811 F.2d 1209, 1214
(9th Cir.1987) (holding that co-defendant
"may not appeal dismissal of additional defendant from [plaintiffs] original claims,
without itself being party-plaintiff to those
claims," even though co-defendant's position
may be affected by the resolution of plaintiffs claims against other defendant).

[3] Therefore, we hold that in a civil action involving multiple defendants, when no
cross-claim is brought between the defendants, and when one of the defendants files a
motion for summary judgment, a co-defendant does not have a right to respond to the
motion. In addition, we hold that a co-defendant barred from arguing against the first
[2] NSI was brought into this case by defendant's motion is also barred from apPacker. When the court granted Norton's pealing the trial court's ruling on the first
motion for summary judgment, thereby dis- defendant's motion. The Utah Rules of Civil
missing Norton from the suit, Norton's al- Procedure, along with the Utah Code, proleged fault could no longer be considered in vide ample ways for a defendant to squarely
Packer's case against NSI. See Sullivan v. contest a co-defendant's argument or motion
Scoular Grain Co. of Utah, 853 PJ2d 877, 878 by bringing a cross-claim or a separate action
(Utah 1993) ("[A]n individual or entity dis- against the co-defendant NSI should have
missed from a case pursuant to an adjudica- followed one of these established, workable
tion on the merits of the liability issue may procedures.
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Our holding on this issue disposes of the
appeal.
CONCLUSION
Because NSI did not bring a cross-claim
against Norton, NSI did not have a right to
respond to Norton's motion for summary
judgment or to appeal the court's order that
granted Norton's motion. Dismissed.
ORME, P.J., and BENCH, J., concur.
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1. Insurance <S>429.1(8)
Insurer's defenses of arson and misrepresentation must be proved by preponderance of evidence, not clear and convincing
evidence.
2. Appeal and Error e=*1064.1(9)
Erroneous instruction that homeowners1
insurer was required to prove defenses of
arson and misrepresentation by clear and
convincing evidence was not harmless in action by insured, even though jury found by
preponderance of evidence that insureds''
claim was not fairly debatable; jurors were
asked to consider all evidence and to determine whether clear and convincing evidence
established arson, they were also asked to
determine whether claim was fairly debatable based on facts that were or should have
been known when insurer denied claim, and
jury thus could have concluded that claim
was not fairly debatable when denied, but
that subsequently obtained evidence would
justify finding of arson by preponderance of
the evidence.

Keith W. Meade, Salt Lake City, for Appellants.
Stephen G. Morgan and Cynthia K.C.
Meyer, Salt Lake City, for Appellees.

Jan. 5, 1996.

Insureds brought action against homeowners' insurer to recover for alleged misconduct in handling claim. The Third District Court, Salt Lake County, Kenneth
Rigtrup, J., granted new trial on ground that
prior trial erroneously required proof of arson and misrepresentation by clear and convincing evidence. Supreme Court granted
petition for interlocutory appeal and turned
case over to Court of Appeals. The Court of
Appeals, Davis, Associate P.J., held that: (1)
as matter of first impression, standard of
proof was preponderance of the evidence, not
clear and convincing evidence, and (2) erroneous instruction requiring clear and convincing was not harmless.
Affirmed.

Before DAVIS, BILLINGS, and
WILKINS, JJ.
DAVIS, Associate Presiding Judge:
Gregory S. Horrell and Barbara Horrell
challenge the trial court's order granting
Utah Farm Bureau Insurance Company and
Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company's
(collectively referred to as Farm Bureau)
motion for a new trial. We affirm.
FACTS
Shortly before midnight on October 3,
1990, the HorreU's residence caught fire.
The fire was extinguished at approximately
2:48 a.m., but rekindled within a couple
hours. The house was ultimately destroyed.

ADDENDUM 3
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS UNDERLYING THE FIRST APPEAL
1. Appellee Norton moved for summary judgment against the
plaintiff. Plaintiff obtained an extension of time to respond (R p.
15, 1. 15-19) and told counsel for appellant NSI that he would
respond (R pp. 15-16, 1. 25-2).
2. Appellant NSI had not anticipated responding to Norton's
motion for summary judgment. When plaintiff's counsel told counsel
for NSI that plaintiff was not going to file a response,
plaintiff's counsel said "whereupon, [counsel for NSI] had a small
fit, and said he was going to file one. I said fine, go ahead. So,
in fairness to [counsel for NSI] he did not know that [plaintiff]
was not going to file a response, . . . until after [plaintiff's]
response time was finished." (R pp. 15-16, 1. 242). Counsel for
appellant NSI responded within several working days. (R p. 9, 1.
22-24).
3. At the summary judgment hearing appellee Norton argued that
NSI's response was weeks late (since NSI did not request an
extension, only the plaintiff did) (R p. 14, 1. 19-25). Appellee
Norton argued co-defendant NSI's response should be ignored,
leaving the court no alternative except to grant Norton's
unresisted motion. (Norton's reply memorandum, p. 2; see also R p.
24, 1. 7-14).
4. NSI argued that it had no obligation to resist a
codefendant's motion, and in fact, did not resist it as long as
Norton's fault would be determined by the jury. (R p. 10, 1. 12; p.
12, 1. 1-5) .
5. NSI requested more time to build a case against Norton and
respond to the summary judgment if the court held that NSI had an
obligation to step into plaintiff's shoes and prove the plaintiff's
case against Norton, or risk having the jury not determine Norton's
fault. (R pp. 11-12, 1. 11-5; p. 23, 1. 611).
6. Plaintiff's counsel maintained he was not obligated to file
a response but that the Court " . . . has an obligation, under the
rules, to decide the motion on the merits." (R p. 20, 1. 1824) An
"on the merits ruling would prevent Norton from having its fault
proportionately determined by the jury.

7. With this unusual procedural position before it, the Court
gave an "advisory opinion" and stated the Court was " . . . inclined
to disregard the opposition to Norton's Motion for Summary Judgment
filed by National Service Industry. And the reason being that it
was not timely filed. . . . Therefore, the status of the record is
that there is a Motion for Summary Judgment by the defendant
Norton. The plaintiff has not responded And the Court is inclined
to find that, based on the merits of the motion, that Norton is
entitled to summary judgment." (R p. 24, 1. 7-14).
8. NSI pointed out that the Court's advisory ruling would work
a great injustice to ignore the merits of the motion yet grant the
motion "on the merits." It would result in NSI paying for Norton's
portion of fault. NSI also pointed out that codefendants seldom
file responses to a co-defendant's motion for summary judgment, and
that NSI had relied on plaintiff's counsel's representation that he
would file a memorandum resisting the motion. (Rpp. 24-25, 1. 175) .
9. Plaintiff's counsel agreed it would be unfair to ignore
NSI's brief, since he had made the representation he would file an
opposition to the motion, and plaintiff's counsel urged the court
to consider the motion on the merits. (R pp. 15-16, 1. 22-2)
10. With this procedural scenario before him, the court
reversed the advisory ruling and agreed to hear the motion
on . . . the merits, or lack thereof." (R p. 29, 1. 13-18)
11. The lower court heard argument on the merits of Norton's
motion for summary judgment and granted it. The lower court ruled
that Norton's fault would not be determined by the jury. The Court
ruled that Norton owed no duty to warn plaintiff and that the
product was not defective as a matter of law.
12. NSI and plaintiff negotiated a settlement and release
which compensated plaintiff for all of his damages, and plaintiff
agreed to assign claims and assist NSI in seeking to have Norton's
fault determined. Plaintiff dismissed his claims against NSI The
lower court's summary judgment against plaintiff, thus became final
and was appealed.

ADDENDUM 4
STATEMENT OF FACTS UNDERLYING THE FIRST APPEAL
1. The seal which injured plaintiff's eye, with the
instruction "Pry Out" imprinted on it, was made by International.
Norton purchased the seal and lid component from International and
incorporated the seal into the top of Norton's pail. (Howard Norton
depo. p. 50, 1. 16-22: p. 19, 1. 5-13)
2. NSI received the container top, including the seal, as one
unit, preassembled by Norton. (Howard Norton Depo. p. 19, 1. 8-13) .
3. Plaintiff followed Norton's imprinted instructions by
prying the seal off with his pocket knife. Plaintiff describes his
accident:
I read the instructions [NSI's] to see how much product
I was going to need, and to see how to use the product.
And at that point, I attempted to remove the lid so that
I could pour out the amount of product that I needed to
use to clean the engine off with. I unscrewed the cap.
After, you know, unscrewing the cap, it had the safety
seal, which was a little metal ring and embossed in it
was the words, "Pry out,"
[International/Norton's
instruction] with an arrow pointing down. At that point,
I took my pocketknife out of my pocket, pried where it
said to pry, heard an explosion, felt something
instantaneously contact my eye, and felt pain.
(Plaintiff's depo. pp. 35-36, 1. 16-1) 4. There was also a printed
label of instructions attached to the container by NSI. The NSI
label gave instructions on how to use the product itself.
5. Norton holds itself out as a "leading supplier of shipping
containers for the Western United States"; that their " . . . pails
are manufactured to meet the standards of the Department of
Transportation" and that "Norton Manufacturing is a major supplier
for many industries including paint, petroleum, chemical, food,
roofing, ag chem adhesives and ink." (Howard Norton depo. Exhibit
1) The pail is normally used to ship liquids. (Norton depo. p. 33,
1. 15-19)
6. Mr. Norton knew of nothing that indicated the plaintiff did
anything improper in removing the lid. (Howard Norton depo. pp. 5152, 1. 24-2)

7. The seal's purpose is a "tamper proof seal." (Deposition of
Norton employee Gerald Bettridge, p. 30, 1. 12)
8. NSI filled the pail with soap, without any alteration of
the seal, and crimped the top onto the pail. NSI then sold the pail
and its ingredients to plaintiff. (R p. 3, 1. 18-19)
9. Dr. Noel de Nevers, a professor of chemical engineering at
the University of Utah Engineering Department, testified that the
accident " . . . was caused by the inner seal piece being driven by
gas pressure into the eye of the plaintiff" (de Nevers depo., p. 8,
1. 14-20) .
10. Dr. de Nevers thought that the pressure may have been
created by chemical reactions in the NSI product, or perhaps by
formation of Peroxides. Dr. de Nevers ran gas chromatograph and
mass spectoptometry tests, and consulted with other experts. He
concluded:
Q. And the other possibility is some chemical reaction,
but you've fairly well ruled that out.
A. I can find no evidence to support it. That doesn't
guarantee that it did not occur
Q. But in your opinion, it did not occur?
A. I believe it did not occur.
(de Nevers Depo. p. 57, 1.13-18; see, also, p. 28, 1. 4-13; pp. 5253, 1. 9-9; p. 54, 1. 17-25; p. 57, 1. 13-18)
11. Dr. Fineman, NSI's chemist, testified that the ingredients
in NSI's soap cannot cause a pressure buildup. ". . . as a chemist,
I have to respond by telling you that there's no basis whatever for
any pressure buildup in this product." (Fineman depo. pp. 32-33, 1.
23-4; p. 36, 1. 7-22)
12. Dr. de Nevers eliminated any chemical reaction of the
contents of the container as the cause of the accident. Rather than
the contents causing pressure, plaintiff's expert testified that
plaintiff's accident occurred because of pressurization due to:
(a) Change in altitude. The product was packaged at sea
level. When opened in Utah's higher altitude, the atmospheric

pressure was less, making the container "pressurized" in
relation to the outside air, independent of the container's
contents; and
(b) the product was packaged at a slightly lower
temperature than the temperature when opened. Higher
temperatures can create higher pressure inside the can. Dr. de
Nevers was uncertain about the affect of temperature on the
NSI can.

ADDENDUM 5
Order of Dismissal and Summary Judgment
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
—oooOooo—
NATIONAL SERVICE INDUSTRIES,
INC.,

:
:

ORDER OF DISMISSAL
AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.

B.W. NORTON MANUFACTURING
COMPANY, INC., a California
corporation; and INTERNATIONAL
MACHINE & TOOL WORKS, INC.,
an Illinois corporation,

Civil No. 950900951
:
Judge Timothy R. Hanson
:

Defendants.
—oooOooo—
The above-entitled matter came before the court on the motion to dismiss of B.W. Norton
Manufacturing Company, Inc. on September 1, 1995. The court having reviewed the memoranda
submitted prior to that hearing and having considered oral argument of counsel presented at the
hearing determined as a matter of law that the first and second causes of action in the plaintiffs
Complaint fail to state a claim upon which relief could be granted since the causes of action in

substance requested relief by way of contribution from defendant Norton to the settlement made by
the plaintiff to the plaintiff Sherman Packer in the Packer v. National Service Industries, Inc. et aL
Civil No. 920902466 (hereinafter Packer litigation).
The Court indicated it thought the third and fourth causes of action should be dismissed
based on res judicata, but that it was not properly before the Court as a motion for summary
judgment. Rather than force a refiling of a second similar motion, counsel for NSI agreed that the
court could consider Norton's motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment on the third and
fourth causes of action, with each party to submit an additional brief.
Accordingly, the court considered the additional legal briefing submitted and reviewed the
judgment from the Packer litigation and in that regard determined that the Packer litigation resulted
in a final judgment in favor of B.W. Norton Manufacturing Company, Inc. (hereinafter Norton).
On September 12,1994, the court in the Packer litigation entered a summary judgment order
dismissing the claims of the plaintiff Packer brought against Norton.
NSI had opposed the summary judgment of Norton in the Packer litigation and the court had
considered the arguments of NSI.
This court determines that the issues raised by NSI in the instant case are barred by res
judicata doctrine as that principle had been established by appellate level courts in this state in cases
including D'Astin v. Astin, 844 P.2d 345, 350 (Utah App. 1992), Jacobsen v. Jacobsen, 703 P.2d
303, 305 (Utah 1985), and Smith v. Smith, 793 P.2d 407, 409 (Utah App. 1990).
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Accordingly, this court determines that claims one and two of the plaintiff fail to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted and further that claims three and four of the plaintiff are barred by
res judicata in that the issues were litigated or could have been litigated in the Packer litigation
between the same parties who are now before this court and said issues have been determined in a
final judgment on the merits in the Packer litigation.
For good cause appearing, it is
HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED, that the motion to dismiss of Norton
is granted and further, this court dismiss claims one and two of NSI as a matter of law, and grants
summary judgment of claims three and four for the reasons stated above and also covered in this
court's Minute Entry of October 16,1995, and therefore the claims of the plaintiff NSI are dismissed
against the defendant B.W. Norton Manufacturing Company, Inc., with prejudice.
DATED this

£0

day ofWtfvombcr 199Sr«
BY THE COURT

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

Todd S. Winegar
Counsel for NSI
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